Optimal Carbon Taxes for Emissions Targets in the Electricity Sector by Olsen, Daniel J. et al.
1Optimal Carbon Taxes for Emissions Targets in the
Electricity Sector
Daniel J. Olsen, Student Member, IEEE, Yury Dvorkin, Member, IEEE, Ricardo Ferna´ndez-Blanco, and
Miguel A. Ortega-Vazquez, Senior Member, IEEE
©2018 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including
reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or
reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. DOI: 10.1109/TPWRS.2018.2827333, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.
Abstract—The most dangerous effects of anthropogenic climate
change can be mitigated by using emissions taxes or other
regulatory interventions to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions. This paper takes a regulatory viewpoint and describes the
Weighted Sum Bisection method to determine the lowest emission
tax rate that can reduce the anticipated emissions of the power
sector below a prescribed, regulatorily-defined target. This bi-
level method accounts for a variety of operating conditions via
stochastic programming and remains computationally tractable
for realistically large planning test systems, even when binary
commitment decisions and multi-period constraints on conven-
tional generators are considered.
Case studies on a modified ISO New England test system
demonstrate that this method reliably finds the minimum tax
rate that meets emissions targets. In addition, it investigates
the relationship between system investments and the tax-setting
process. Introducing GHG emissions taxes increases the value
proposition for investment in new cleaner generation, trans-
mission, and energy efficiency; conversely, investing in these
technologies reduces the tax rate required to reach a given
emissions target.
NOMENCLATURE
Sets and Indices
A Set of representative days, indexed by a.
B Set of transmission network buses, indexed by b.
I Set of generating units, indexed by i.
L Set of transmission lines, indexed by l.
R Subset of renewable generators (R ⊂ I).
S Set of generator power output blocks, indexed by s.
T Set of time intervals, indexed by t or τ .
Parameters
bi,s Marginal cost of block s of generator i ($/MWh).
Cmini Minimum cost of generator i ($/h).
Csui Start-up cost of generator i ($).
db,t,a Demand at bus b, time t, day a (MW).
drampt,a Load ramp requirement at time t, day a (MW/h).
Emax Regulator’s GHG emission target (tons).
Emini Minimum GHG emissions of generator i (tons/h).
Esui Start-up GHG emissions of generator i (tons).
fmaxl Capacity of transmission line l (MW).
gmaxi Maximum power output of generator i (MW).
gmini Minimum power output of generator i (MW).
gmaxi,s Maximum power output of block s, generator i (MW).
gdowni Minimum down-time of generator i (h).
gupi Minimum up-time of generator i (h).
hi,s Marginal GHG emissions of block s, generator i
(tons/MWh).
mlinel,b Line connection map. m
line
lb = 1 if line l starts at bus
b, = −1 if line l ends in bus b, 0 otherwise.
muniti,b Unit map. m
unit
i,b = 1 if generator i is located at bus b,
0 otherwise.
PCO2 GHG emissions tax rate ($/ton-CO2e).
P load Load shed penalty ($/MWh).
P ren Renewable generation shed penalty ($/MWh).
rdowni Maximum down-ramp rate of generator i (MW/h).
rupi Maximum up-ramp rate of generator i (MW/h).
wdownt,a Wind down-ramp requirements at time t, day a
(MW/h).
wupt,a Wind up-ramp requirements at time t, day a (MW/h).
xl Reactance of line l (Ω).
pia Probability of day a.
Variables
Cgen System operator’s generation cost ($).
Cshed System operator’s shed cost ($).
Ea GHG Emissions for day a (tons).
Etotal Total GHG emissions (tons).
fl,t,a Power flow on line l, time t, day a (MW).
gi,t,a Power output of generator i, time t, day a (MW).
gi,s,t,a Power output of generator i, block s, time t, day a
(MW).
sloadb,t,a Load shed at bus b, time t, day a (MWh).
srenb,t,a Renewable generation shed at bus b, time t, day a
(MWh).
ui,t,a Binary variable for the commitment status of genera-
tor i, time t, day a.
vi,t,a Binary variable for the start-up of generator i, time t,
day a.
zi,t,a Binary variable for the shut-down of generator i, time
t, day a.
θb,t,a Voltage phase angle of bus b, time t, day a (rad).
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
The risks posed by anthropogenic climate change are dire,
and organized effort is required in order to mitigate and
eliminate, when possible, the effects [1]. Pricing the emissions
of greenhouse gases (GHGs) is a well-established approach
to internalizing these negative externalities and should result
in shifting the supply-demand equilibrium to a socially opti-
mal point [2]. Since the true costs from climate change are
uncertain and hard to quantify with any precision (though
attempts have been made, as in [3]), one approach to create
a price for emissions is to design policies that aim to reduce
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2emissions to a level that is generally accepted to avoid the
worst effects. Unlike renewable portfolio standards or tax
credits for renewable energy investment or production, this
approach is directly targeted toward reducing GHG emissions.
As noted in [4], subsidies for production of renewable energy
can lead to negative bids by renewable generators, which may
result in higher costs and emissions than if they bid zero-cost.
According to a 2017 study by the World Bank [5], there are
47 regional, national, and sub-national carbon pricing schemes
implemented or scheduled for implementation, ranging from
$1-140/tCO2e and covering 15% of global emissions.
The two main approaches to pricing emissions are a tax
on GHG emissions (i.e. a carbon tax) [6] and a cap-and-trade
system [7]. A carbon tax sets a price directly with the goal
of implicitly reducing emissions, while a cap-and-trade system
sets emissions reductions explicitly, implicitly creating a price.
Each system has pros and cons: a cap-and-trade system can be
more precise about the level of emissions reductions achieved,
but requires complex rules regarding distributing, auctioning,
and trading of allowances. A carbon tax is simpler and may
be easier to implement, but impact on emissions is less certain
[8], as the reactions to such a tax by the broader market (e.g.
generation and transmission investors, electricity consumers,
and generation manufacturers) are difficult to model.
Secondary policy considerations are similar between the
two: entities may purchase carbon offsets to reduce net emis-
sions, tariffs can maintain competitiveness with jurisdictions
without carbon pricing, and policies can be designed to
be revenue-neutral. Such policy design considerations for a
carbon tax are discussed in [9], [10]. Additionally, pricing of
carbon in either approach can lead to carbon ‘leakage’, i.e.
the increased cost of producing goods in a jurisdiction with a
carbon tax can lead to a shift in production toward jurisdictions
with lower rates, or no tax at all [11].
The impact of carbon taxes on the economy and the envi-
ronment have been widely studied, using various tax rates: the
Brookings Institute in 2012 studied a tax which would begin
at $15/tCO2e with an annual escalator [12], the Congressional
Budget Office in 2013 evaluated various rates between $15-
29/tCO2e [13], and the Energy Information Agency in 2014
investigated rates of $10 & $25/tCO2e [14]. However, these
studies do not address at what rate carbon should be taxed.
This paper approaches the topic from a different angle.
Instead of studying the impact of a certain tax rate, we set a
tax rate to achieve a certain environmental impact (e.g. pledges
from the Paris Agreement [15]) at minimal tax rate. Specifi-
cally, we present an approach for setting the optimal carbon
tax for a given power system such that the resulting minimum-
cost generator commitment and dispatch yields emissions that
are at or below a specified target. The consequence of a tax
rate that is too low is failure to meet emissions targets, and
the consequence of a rate too high is undue economic burden.
Minimizing the tax rate also has practical motivations: lower
tax rates are often more politically palatable (i.e. more likely
to be enacted, less likely to be repealed), and generally reduce
rates of tax evasion [16].
Some carbon taxing systems are designed to ‘recycle’
the revenue received, either by investing in clean generation
technologies or by reducing tax rates on other sectors of
the economy to achieve revenue ‘neutrality’. However, care
must be taken to account for the uncertainty in future carbon
consumption, especially as carbon pricing tends to reduce
consumption.
B. Literature Survey
Work including emissions into generator dispatch began in
the 1970s with the concepts of minimum emissions dispatch
[17], pricing of emissions to include their impact in economic
dispatch [18], and varying emissions prices to investigate the
tradeoffs between fuel costs and emissions [19]. However,
these studies focused on local effects of NOx and SOx.
The concepts of ‘pseudo fuel prices’ and algorithms for
setting them are explored in [20], and expanded in [21] to
include periodic price adaptation in order to meet long-term
fuel consumption targets as realizations differ from projec-
tions. Similar algorithms are used to set weights based on
emissions targets in [22] for economic dispatch problems.
Several methods for coordinating long-term targets for emis-
sions and short-term operations are discussed in [23], [24], but
explicit emission pricing is absent, to the best of the authors’
knowledge.
Explicit GHG pricing and its impact on optimal power
flow problems are discussed in [25]. [26] presents a bi-level
approach for setting a tax rate to achieve a GHG emissions
target with minimal tax burden, but intertemporal constraints
(e.g. ramp rates, start-ups) are ignored. Without considering
these constraints, the determined tax rate may not meet the
desired target. ‘Optimal’ tradeoffs between GHG emissions
and cost according to a Nash bargaining process are developed
in [27], [28].
All of the above approaches contain deficiencies when it
comes to setting a carbon tax rate with an eye on scheduling
algorithms (i.e. unit commitment models). In short, one or
more of the following is missing:
1) Intertemporal variables and constraints (e.g. ramp rate
limitations, minimum up- and down-times).
2) Explicit carbon pricing in dispatch/commitment.
3) A method for setting an optimal carbon price.
By contrast, in this work we propose a Weighted Sum Bi-
section (WSB) method, a computationally efficient approach,
to set the minimal carbon tax rate that results in a power
system meeting emissions targets while incorporating unit
commitment, ramp rate limitations, and system flexibility and
contingency reserve requirements.
C. Contributions
This work makes the following contributions:
1) A bi-level planning model including unit commitment
based on cyclic representative days, avoiding the need
for assumptions about initial conditions.
2) An efficient method for determining the minimal carbon
tax rate which achieves emissions reductions targets.
3) A demonstration of the computational efficiency of
the proposed method and of the reciprocal relationship
between tax rates for emissions targets and investment
decisions.
3II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The problem is formulated as a bi-level planning problem,
with the regulator’s tax rate (PCO2 ) optimization in the upper
level (1)-(2) and the system operator’s unit commitment with
carbon tax (UCCT), over a set of representative days, in
the lower level (3)-(21). The UCCT includes the dc power
flow approximation of the system power flows, penalties for
shedding load and renewable generation, and reserve and
ramping adequacy requirements. We assume an electricity
market based on a unit commitment in which bids represent
true fuel and tax costs.
minPCO2 (1)
subject to:
Etotal ≤ Emax (2)
Etotal ∈ arg min
{
Cshed + Cgen + PCO2Etotal (3)
Cshed :=
∑
a∈A
pia
∑
t∈T
∑
b∈B
(
P loadsloadb,t,a +
∑
i∈R
P rensreni,t,a
)
(4)
Cgen :=
∑
a∈A
pia
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
(
Cmini ui,t,a + C
su
i vi,t,a
+
∑
s∈S
bi,sgi,s,t,a
)
(5)
Etotal :=
∑
a∈A
pia
∑
i∈I
∑
t∈T
(
Emini ui,t,a + E
su
i vi,t,a
+
∑
s∈S
hi,sgi,s,t,a
)
(6)
subject to:
gi,t,a = g
min
i ui,t,a +
∑
s∈S
gi,s,t,a ; ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T, a ∈ A (7)
0 ≤ gi,s,t,a ≤ gmaxi,s ui,t,a ∀i ∈ I, s ∈ S, t ∈ T, a ∈ A (8)
vi,t,a + zi,t,a ≤ 1 ; ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T, a ∈ A (9)
vi,t,a − zi,t,a = ui,t,a − ui,t−1,a ; ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T, a ∈ A (10)
t∑
τ=t−gupi +1
vi,τ,a ≤ ui,t,a ; ∀t ∈ T, i ∈ I, a ∈ A (11)
t∑
τ=t−gdowni +1
zi,τ,a ≤ 1− ui,t,a ; ∀t ∈ T, i ∈ I, a ∈ A (12)
−rdowni ≤ gi,t,a − gi,t−1,a ≤ rupi ; ∀t ∈ T, i ∈ I, a ∈ A (13)∑
i∈I
muniti,b gi,t,a −
∑
l∈L
mlinel,b fl,t,a − srenb,t,a =
db,t,a − sloadb,t,a ; ∀b ∈ B, t ∈ T, a ∈ A (14)
−fmaxl ≤ fl,t,a ≤ fmaxl ; ∀l ∈ L, t ∈ T, a ∈ A (15)
fl,t,a =
1
xl
∑
b∈B
mlinel,b θb,t,a, ; ∀l ∈ L, t ∈ T, a ∈ A (16)∑
i∈I\R
ui,t,a(g
max
i − gi,t,a) ≥3%
∑
b∈B
db,t,a + 5%
∑
i∈R
gi,t,a
+ max
i∈I
gmaxi ; ∀t ∈ T, a ∈ A (17)∑
i∈I
min
(
rupi ui,t,a, (g
max
i − gi,t,a)
) ≥ wupt,a + drampt,a ;
∀t ∈ T, a ∈ A (18)∑
i∈I
min
((
rdowni ui,t,a, gi,t,a − gmini
)) ≥ wdownt,a + drampt,a ;
∀t ∈ T, a ∈ A (19)
0 ≤ sloadb,t,a ≤ db,t,a ; ∀b ∈ B, t ∈ T, a ∈ A (20)
0 ≤ srenb,t,a ≤
∑
i∈R
muniti,b gi,t,a ; ∀b ∈ B, t ∈ T, a ∈ A
}
(21)
The regulator’s objective is given in (1), and constrained by
the emission limit (2) and the lower-level problem (3)-(21).
The system operator’s objective is given in (3)-(6). Generator
costs curves are piecewise linear (7)-(8). Binary commitment
variables are defined in (9)-(10) and generator minimum up-
and down-times are constrained using (11)-(12). Generator
ramp rate constraints are given in (13). Power balance is given
by (14). Line flow limits are given by (15)-(16). Operating
reserve requirements based on the 3+5% and N -1 policies
are ensured using (17) with flexibility requirements ensured
in (18)-(19). Load and renewable generation shedding is
constrained by physical limits in (20)-(21).
For the intertemporal constraints (10)-(13), time periods
before the first are treated cyclically. For instance, t = 24
is substituted for t = 0, and t = 23 for t = −1. This ensures
that end-of-day commitments are feasible and that initial con-
ditions are representative, assuming that the days surrounding
the representative day are substantially similar. Considering
constraints (17)-(19), the ideal quantity of regulation and load-
following reserves is an active research topic [29], [30]; for
simplicity, we use the heuristic 3+5% rule originally proposed
in [31]. This formulation assumes a perfectly competitive
market; otherwise, the impact of the carbon tax on emissions
may vary, as shown in [32].
III. SOLUTION TECHNIQUES
One approach to finding the optimal tax rate would be to
solve a standard unit commitment over the set of representative
days, with a constraint on total emissions, and to take the
marginal value of the emissions constraint as the tax rate:
minCgen + Cshed (22)
Equations (4)-(21) (23)
Etotal ≤ Emax : λ (24)
where λ denotes the marginal value of the constraint.
We call such an approach “Constrained Emission Marginal
Value (CEMV)” method. However, due to the non-convexity of
the UCCT problem (due to binary variables), this approach is
liable to produce sub-optimal solutions. Varying Emax will find
solutions on the Pareto frontier of the feasible cost/emissions
space, but the resulting λ, when used as PCO2 in the UCCT,
may find different solutions. This is because concave portions
of the Pareto frontier may not be found by the linearly
weighted UCCT formulation, since the optima only exist on
the convex hull of the Pareto frontier [33]. This undesirable
outcome is illustrated in Fig. 1 and demonstrated for the test
system in Section V. Depending on where in the convex region
Emax falls, the value of λ (i.e. the slope of the curve) when
input as PCO2 into the UCCT problem may find: a) a solution
with emissions which are greater than the target (A → A’ in
the figure), b) a solution in which emissions are lower than the
target, but the production cost is higher than necessary (B →
B’), c) the optimal cost/emissions point, but at a PCO2 that is
larger than necessary, or d) the minimum PCO2 which results
in the optimal cost/emissions point. Therefore, it should not
be assumed that the CEMV method can find (d) reliably.
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Fig. 1. The marginal values at points {A,B}, when used as tax rates, result
in the solutions at {A’,B’}.
By contrast, the WSB method finds the optimal tax rate by
iteratively guessing a PCO2 value, solving the UCCT problem,
and tuning PCO2 using the bisection method. Briefly, if a zero
of a continuous function is known to be in a certain interval, it
can be reliably found by repeatedly bisecting the interval and
selecting the sub-interval in which the root must lie, based
on the sign of the function value at the midpoint. Since the
goal is to find the tax rate resulting in emissions at or below a
certain target, the function is f(PCO2) =Etotal(PCO2)−Emax,
and its zero-crossing is at the value of the optimal tax rate,
where Etotal(PCO2) is found for a given value of PCO2 by
solving the UCCT. For a given value of PCO2 , the UCCT can
be solved independently for each representative day, aiding
computation. For a non-convex Pareto frontier such as ours,
the values of the individual objectives as a function of the
weighting factor are noncontinuous but monotonic. Therefore,
the WSB method is guaranteed to find the smallest tax rate
resulting in emissions at or below the target, if this target is
feasible. A very high tax rate (e.g. $1,000/ton) can be used
to estimate the maximum feasible emissions reduction and set
the upper bound of the tax range. Since precision is doubled
with each iteration, convergence is linear [34]. This approach
is shown in Fig. 2.
Ptest = (Pmax+Pmin)/2
Pmin = PtestYes
Pmax = Ptest No
No Yes
Etotal ≤ Emax?
Pmax – Pmin < ε ?
Begin with 
Pmin=0, Pmax
large
P* = Ptest
Solve UCCT with Ptest
Fig. 2. Flowchart for finding optimal PCO2 using the Weighted Sum Bisection
method.
IV. CASE STUDY
The electrical system for this case study is a modified ISO
New England (NE) test system [35]. Data from the Energy
Information Administration (EIA) are used for fuel prices [36]
and for per-MMBTu CO2e emissions by fuel [37]. Though
variability from renewable generation can induce additional
CO2 emissions from thermal generators [38], this effect was
not modeled in the case study. Five representative days are
chosen using a hierarchical clustering algorithm [39] and
run at a one-hour time resolution. The load shed penalty is
set at $10,000/MWh and the renewable spillage penalty is
$20/MWh. Ramping requirements are set such that the system
has the capacity to react to 1%/hour load ramps and all wind
farms ramping their production ± 20% over one hour, based
on analysis of Bonneville Power Administration wind power
production data in [40]. This case study was implemented
using GAMS v24.0 and solved using CPLEX v12.5 with a
0.1% optimality gap on an Intel Xenon 2.55 GHz processor
with at least 32 GB RAM.
V. RESULTS
A. System Characteristics
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Fig. 3. The cost/emissions Pareto frontier. The line is points found by
constraining emissions, the crosses are points found by varying PCO2 .
Fig. 3 shows the Pareto frontier of the trade-off between
emissions and production costs (i.e. fuel and shed costs). The
full Pareto frontier is sampled at 100 equally-spaced points by
constraining emissions and varying Emax, and the convex hull
of the cost/emissions space is sampled by using the UCCT and
varying PCO2 , with and without load-shedding. Load shedding
is only economically justified under very high tax rates and
results in very high costs, so load-shedding solutions are
omitted in all following figures for the sake of clarity. Though
the Pareto frontier may at first glance appear convex, there are
many small concave regions. This can be seen by plotting the
marginal value at the sample points, as shown in Fig. 4; since
the marginal values do not increase monotonically, the frontier
must be non-convex [41].
B. Determining a Tax Rate to Meet Policy Goals
If the CEMV method were used to set a tax rate, there is
no guarantee that the solution to the UCCT problem would
meet the desired emissions reduction. This is illustrated in
Fig. 5, which uses the same set of sample points as Figs.
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Fig. 4. Marginal value found at 100 sample points on the Pareto frontier.
3 and 4. As shown, values of PCO2 derived from the CEMV
method do not reliably meet their desired emissions reductions
when used in the UCCT. By comparison, the WSB method is
guaranteed to meet or exceed the emissions reduction target.
Convergence of the WSB method to its final values is shown
in Fig. 6 for a target emissions reduction of 15%. The WSB
method, given an emissions target, reliably converges to an
optimal tax rate within 1¢ from an initial range of $0-$100/ton
in 14 iterations of the UCCT problem. Though the tax rate
which is converged upon may not be the true optimum, it
can be shown that the solution exceeds the true optimum by
no more than a specified tolerance, and this tolerance can be
halved with each additional iteration of the UCCT problem. By
comparison, naively finding the tax rate by solving for each
possible rate in 1¢ increments would require 10,000 solves.
The wider the range of potential solutions, and the greater the
desired accuracy, the more efficiently the WSB performs.
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Fig. 5. Comparison of results using the CEMV method and the WSB method.
The importance of including binary variables is illustrated
in Fig. 7. For this figure, the UCCT formulation is transformed
into a transmission-constrained economic dispatch (TCED)
problem by ignoring intertemporal constraints (10)-(13) and
setting gmini , C
min
i , E
min
i = 0 for all generators. By using the
WSB method to find the required tax rate for a given desired
emissions reduction for the TCED problem, and inputting that
resulting tax rate into the UCCT problem, it can be seen
that the realized emissions reductions fail to meet the targets.
Factors which can contribute to this outcome include: the
requirement to burn fuel to synchronize generators on start-up,
and the requirement to commit additional generators to prepare
for large ramps in net load, which occur more commonly
and with greater magnitude with the introduction of large
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Fig. 6. Convergence of WSB method to final value.
quantities of renewables.
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Fig. 7. Comparison of WSB results when ignoring binary variables and in-
tertemportal constraints (TCED problem) vs. including them (UCCT method).
C. Handling Uncertainty
Since this formulation requires estimating the distribution of
representative days in a future year, there is some uncertainty
in the actual realization. The variance in annual realized
emissions, based on this sampling probability, is given by
(25). If policy-makers desire to achieve emissions reductions
with a specified level of certainty, tax rates can be set such
that the likelihood of achieving such reduction happens with
the desired probability using (26) due to the Central Limit
Theorem [42].
Var[Etotal] = σ2E = 365
∑
a∈A
pia(Ea − Etotal)2 (25)
Prob[Etotal ≤ Emax] = Φ
(
Emax − Etotal
σEtotal
)
(26)
where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the
standard normal distribution.
The choice of increasing or decreasing the tax rate in the
WSB method is then based on whether this likelihood meets
the desired level of certainty. Fig. 8 illustrates the uncertainty
range around the expected cost and emissions, and Fig. 9
illustrates the tax rate required to achieve a desired emissions
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Fig. 8. Fuel cost and emissions as a function of tax rate, incorporating weather
uncertainty. Bands represent 95% certainty range.
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Fig. 9. Tax rate required to achieve emissions reductions, based on weather
uncertainty.
reduction for various values of certainty. As shown, the re-
quired tax rate to meet a given emissions target increases with
the level of certainty required, and some emissions reductions
targets which are achievable on average are not able to be met
with much certainty, no matter the tax rate.
A similar process can be used in order to handle the uncer-
tainty of fuel prices. Currently in the United States, abundant
shale gas makes gas-fired power plants more competitive, but
these low prices may not persist. If there is a desire to set a
tax rate to be robust to fluctuations in the price of natural gas,
the tax-setting process can be run using the highest gas price
that can be reasonably expected.
D. Sensitivity Analyses
Sensitivity analyses to changes in the system’s wind pen-
etration, coal plant retirement, gas prices, and gas supply
limitations on UCCT solutions are shown in Figs. 10(a)-
(d), respectively, and the impact on the tax rates required to
achieve desired emissions reductions are shown in Figs. 11(a)-
(d). Additional scenarios are also run for specific emissions
reductions targets and shown in Fig. 12:
• Wind Penetration: Wind penetration, initially at 8% of
total energy, is increased by 10, 20, or 50%.
• Coal Retirement: Coal generation is retired, either one
or two highest-cost generators (15% or 30% of the coal-
generating capacity), consistent with estimates in [43].
• New Gas Generator: One new 250 MW gas generator is
added at the bus with highest average locational marginal
price (LMP), bus 8, increasing the gas capacity by 2.4%.
• Gas Price: The price of natural gas generation is in-
creased by either 50 or 100%.
• Gas Limit: For each day, gas generators are limited in
the amount of energy that they can supply, at either 30
or 35% of daily total energy. This is intended to simulate
regional gas shortages such as those experienced in New
England [44] and Southern California [45] in 2014.
• Load Increase/Decrease: The demand for electricity at
each hour is scaled up or down by 2%.
• Transmission Capacity: The capacity of all transmission
corridors is increased by 20%.
Several of these scenarios have similar effects: increases
in wind penetration, gas generation capacity, or transmission
capacity, or decreases in load. For all of these scenarios, the
zero-tax solutions have lower costs and emissions than the
base case, a given emissions target can be met with a lower
tax rate, and the maximum emissions reduction is increased.
These effects can be seen in Figs. 10(a) and 11(a) for the wind
penetration case and in Fig 12 for the other cases.
Other scenarios have differing effects. For the coal plant
retirement case, the zero-tax solution has lower emissions
than the base case but is more expensive, since the retired
coal generation is replaced by more-expensive gas generation.
However, despite the higher zero-tax cost, a desired emissions
reduction can be met with a lower tax rate, as shown in Figs.
10(b) and 11(b), and some targets can be met at a lower total
cost. For example, a 15% GHG reduction target in the base
case requires a tax rate of $23/ton and a total cost of increase
of 71%, but the same target can be met with a $17/ton tax
rate and 56% cost increase in the 30% coal retirement case,
as shown in Fig. 12. For the gas price increase cases, the zero-
tax solution is both more expensive and higher-emitting than
the base case, and a desired emissions reduction requires a
higher tax rate, but the range of possible emissions reductions
is not affected, as shown in Figs. 10(c) and 11(c). For the
case where there are limitations on the energy supplied by gas
generators, the effect is highly dependent on the limit values
and emissions targets, as shown in Figs. 10(d) and 11(d). When
gas generators are limited to providing no more than 35% of
total energy, there is minimal impact for emissions reductions
less than 10%, but past this point there is limited ability to
reduce emissions, and reductions require a higher tax rate. At a
limit of 30%, the zero-tax solution is 7.6% more expensive and
emits 7.6% more GHGs when compared to the base case, and
only a very modest reduction in emissions (1.5%) is possible.
This illustrates the impact that gas system constraints can have
on emission reductions goals.
The impact of relaxing the system flexibility constraints
(18)-(19) is also investigated. For this system, the greatest
impact is seen at lower tax rates, where relaxing the ramping
capability requirement results in slightly higher emissions at
slightly lower production cost, as shown in Fig. 13(a). At
zero tax rate, emissions are 0.4% higher and production cost
is 0.1% lower as compared to the base case. The impact
on the tax rate required for a given emission reduction is
similar, as shown in Fig. 13(b): greater impact at low emis-
sions reductions targets, with differences diminishing at more
aggressive emissions reductions targets. The converse is true
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Fig. 10. Sensitivities of Pareto frontier to (a) wind penetration, (b) coal plant retirement, (c) natural gas price, and (d) gas supply limit.
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Fig. 12. Results of selected scenarios for specified emission reduction targets, (a) total cost, (b) required tax rate.
when observing the impact on profit by generation technology:
low tax rates have minimal impact, while higher tax rates
have more significant impacts. At tax rates of $0-10/ton, the
average impact on profit is within 1.5% for all generation
technologies, while for tax rates of $10-100/ton, relaxing the
flexibility constraints results in profits on average 102% higher
for coal generators, and 5-6% lower for all other generation
technologies.
E. Impact on Investment Decisions
As can be seen in Fig. 14(a), larger emissions reduction tar-
gets lead to higher average LMPs, which translates to a better
value proposition for investing in new non-coal generation (as
shown in Fig. 14(b), the carbon tax reduces profit by coal
generators). For example, at a target emissions reduction of
5%, the profit for wind generators is 17% higher as compared
to the zero-tax solution; at a target of 10%, the profit is 33%
higher. In the New Gas Generator scenario, the new generator
makes 12% more profit at an emissions reduction target of
10%; at a target reduction of 5%, no tax is required.
Along with higher LMPs, emission reduction targets also
result in increased congestion surplus, improving the value
proposition for investments in new transmission. At a target
GHG reduction of 5%, the congestion surplus is increased
by 9.5%; at a 10% target the surplus is increased by 16.1%.
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Fig. 14. (a) Average LMPs for buses b1-b8 as a function of desired emissions
reduction, and (b) Profit by fuel as a function of desired emissions reduction.
Congestion surplus as a share of total cost remains relatively
constant, however: 20.6% in the zero-tax case, 20.4% in the
5% target case, and 19.6% in the 10% target case.
In addition to higher average LMPs, there is also an
increase in the variability of LMPs, which improves the value
proposition for grid-scale energy storage devices, consistent
with findings in [46]. At a 5% emissions reduction target,
the average LMP for each bus is 35-60% higher (average of
46%), while the standard deviation of LMPs for each bus is
101-113% higher. However, while investments in wind and
gas generation tend to reduce emissions (and therefore the tax
rate required to meet emissions targets), the impact of energy
storage is much less clear [47].
F. Coal Generators and Market Share
As would be expected, as the desired emissions reduction
and the tax rate required to achieve this reduction both
increase, the share of energy which is provided by coal and
the profit made by coal generators both decrease, as can
be seen in Figs. 14(b) and 15. These reduced profits may
lead to earlier coal generation retirement and reductions in
coal mining employment [48]. However, strategic investments
in new wind generation and transmission network expansion
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Fig. 15. Energy by fuel as a function of tax rate.
TABLE I
COAL PROFIT DEPENDENCE ON INVESTMENTS, 5% REDUCTION TARGET,
GIVEN INCREASES IN WIND PENETRATION OR TRANSMISSION CAPACITY
Scenario Additional Coal
Profit ($)
Additional Wind
Profit ($)
% Increase
(coal/wind)
+10% Wind 24,212 77,336 31.3%
+20% Wind 62,170 140,276 44.3%
+10% Trans. 22,835 N/A N/A
+20% Trans. 131,112 N/A N/A
both allow emissions targets to be met with a lower tax
rate compared to the base case, and increase the profit of
coal-powered generators, as shown in Table I. Additionally,
emissions taxes which are set based on emissions targets
increase the incentive for owners of coal-powered generation
to invest in renewable generation, since the increased profits
for coal generators caused by a lower tax rate provides an
‘extra’ revenue stream.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Weighted Sum Bisection method can be efficiently
applied to the problem of determining the optimal tax rate
to meet a given emissions target, and has been shown to
be compatible with uncertainty in weather, demand, fuel
prices, and generation fleet. In addition to changing short-
term generator commitment and dispatch, pricing carbon for
emissions targets is also associated with several longer-term
effects.
Higher prices for electricity reduce overall demand and
increase the value proposition for investment in new cleaner
generation, transmission, and grid-scale energy storage, as
well as technologies which generate or consume electricity
more efficiently. Carbon capture and sequestration projects
also become more attractive. Conversely, investment in these
resources reduces the tax rate required to achieve certain
emissions targets.
In addition, carbon pricing collects revenue which can be
used to invest in projects to reduce GHG emissions, adapt to
climate change, and/or provide economic relief to communities
which are negatively impacted by taxation of carbon, such
as those heavily reliant on coal-mining. This revenue stream
could also be used to offset tax reductions elsewhere to obtain
revenue neutrality.
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